The Impacts of Strengthening Regulatory Surveillance on Bank Behavior: A Dynamic Analysis from Incomplete to Complete Enforcement of Capital Regulation in Microprudential Policy
Kiyotaka Nakashima and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This study examines the impact of strengthening bank capital supervision on bank behavior in the incomplete enforcement of regulations. In a dynamic model of banks facing persistent idiosyncratic shocks, banks accumulate regulatory capital and decrease charter value and lending in the short run, while in the long run, the banking system achieves stability. To test the short-run implications, we utilize the introduction of the prompt corrective action program in Japan as a quasi-natural experiment. Using some empirical specifications with bank- and loan-level data, we find empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions.
Keywords: regulatory surveillance; incomplete enforcement; heterogeneous bank model; prompt corrective action; bank capital ratio; credit crunch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G00 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-fdg, nep-isf and nep-rmg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:109147
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