The future of the Central Bank and its autonomy in the Chilean Constitutional Convention
Felipe Castro Azócar
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Regarding the discussion on a New Constitution in Chile, the debate on the autonomy of the Central Bank has polarized: Some consider it fundamental for macroeconomic balances, and others question it as an "authoritarian enclave". Should the Constitution settle this issue? It will be seen that it is not so much what it says on paper that matters, but how the autonomy and independence of the Central Bank are articulated in the reality.
Keywords: Constitutional autonomy; Central Bank autonomy; price stability; Chilean new constitution; economic policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E3 E6 K0 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-law, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:110173
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