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Expert-based Knowledge: Communicating over Scientific Models

Philippe Colo ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Scientific models structure our perception of reality. This paper studies how we choose among them under expert advise. Scientific models are formalised as probability distributions over possible scenarios. An expert is assumed to know the most likely model and seeks to communicate it to a decision maker, but cannot prove it. As a result, communication is a cheap talk game over models. The decision maker is in a situation of model-uncertainty and is ambiguity sensitive. I show that information transmission depends on the strategic misalignment of players and, unlike similar models in the literature, a form of consensus among scientific models. When science is divided, there is an asymmetry in information transmission when the receiver has maxmin expected utility preferences. No information can be conveyed over models above a certain threshold. All equilibria of the game are outcome equivalent to a partitional equilibria and the most informative one is interim Pareto dominant.

Keywords: Ambiguity; cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110434/1/MPRA_paper_110434.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110489/8/MPRA_paper_110489.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110488/1/MPRA_paper_110488.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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