Linking Reputations: The Signaling and Feedback Effects of Umbrella Branding

Jeanine Miklós-Thal ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. I show that while umbrella branding can credibly signal positive quality correlation, there are no equilibria in which umbrella branding either fully reveals high quality, or signals negative quality correlation. Finally, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already produce high quality products have stronger incentives to invest in developing further high quality products than firms that are currently inactive or produce low quality products.

Keywords: reputation; umbrella branding; brand extensions; quality signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L15 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11045/1/MPRA_paper_11045.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26853/1/MPRA_paper_26853.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11045

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().