Common Ownership and Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility

Kosuke Hirose and Toshihiro Matsumura

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We theoretically investigate how common ownership (or the extent of collusion in an industry) affects firms' voluntary commitment with emission restrictions and emissions abatement activities in an oligopoly. We find that common ownership reduces emissions by reducing output, and may stimulate emissions abatement activities if the degree of common ownership is small. However, significant common ownership always reduces emissions abatement activities. Additionally, common ownership may or may not improve welfare, depending on the implicit carbon cost.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility; anticompetitive effect; voluntary emissions cap; emissions abatement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 M14 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/111120/1/MPRA_paper_111120.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Common ownership and environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:111120

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