Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour
Gary Madden and
Scott Savage ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Recent technology change and market liberalization have substantially reduced the costs of providing international message telephone services (IMTS). However, the full extent of these cost reductions have generally not been reflected in lower prices. This paper reviews the recent literature on international telecommunications markets, and examines regulation and IMTS pricing behaviour. Particular attention is given to the accounting rate system (ARS), uniform settlement policies, and asymmetric competition. Several market behaviour scenarios are described where regulation has resulted in carriers implementing inefficient pricing rules for both accounting and collection rates. Finally, economic and political strategies are put forward that could supplant the current outmoded and uneconomic ARS, and bring about the full benefits of a freely functioning marketplace to telecommunications users.
Keywords: Regulation; and; international; telecommunications; pricing; behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Published in Industrial and Corporate Change 1.10(2001): pp. 247-265
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Related works:
Journal Article: Regulation and International Telecommunications Pricing Behaviour (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11121
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