Strategie di governo e strutture egemoniche in tempo di pandemia

Governance strategies and hegemonic structures in times of pandemic

Nicolo' Bellanca

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper discusses pandemic governance strategies and argues that, even in the absence of a single successful model, some indispensable characteristics for an adequate strategy are nevertheless identifiable. On the basis of these characteristics, it is possible to evaluate what the various governments have (or have not) achieved. It then examines a governance perspective that holds together the protection of lives, economic needs and the quality of social relations. It suggests that, facing a pandemic in the 21st century, this perspective is, even if imperfectly, approximable. Finally, the chapter addresses the interpretative category within which to place the pandemic event. The pandemic is usually interpreted as a crisis, within a conception whereby social change occurs through long phases of stability interspersed with sudden and rapid discontinuities. However, this does not appear appropriate in regard to a shock which, in several respects, is becoming chronic, and which is therefore destined to last. Therefore, to better represent the salient aspects of the current phase, the Gramscian notion of “interregnum” is taken up and reworked.

Keywords: Pandemia; Interregno; Declino italiano; Strategie di governo; Egemonia; Gramsci (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I12 I18 O38 P17 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:111234

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