Wage-rise contract and mixed Cournot duopoly competition with profit-maximizing and socially concerned firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates a Cournot game model with a nonlinear demand function where a profit-maximizing firm competes against a socially concerned firm. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, each firm non-cooperatively decides whether to offer a wage-rise contract policy as a strategic commitment device. In stage two, after observing the rival’s decision in stage one, each firm non-cooperatively chooses its actual output. The paper presents the equilibrium solutions of the model.

Keywords: Cournot model; Corporate social responsibility; Profit-maximizing firm; Socially concerned firm; Wage-rise contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-03-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:112536

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