Welfare dynamics based on a new concept of inefficient equilibrium

Md Monowaruz Zaman ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article has developed a new model of welfare dynamics under imperfect information or imperfect competition by introducing a new concept of ‘inefficient welfare equilibrium’. It assumes that an economy can be split into two virtual parts. For one part the fundamental welfare theorems are valid and for the other part welfare is yet to achieve. This model is enhanced to describe market dynamics where market is not uniform but distributed in layers of energy states. The probability of achieving Pareto efficiency decreases down along the market energy states.

Keywords: Pareto efficiency; Pareto improvement; information; principal-agent problem; welfare; poverty; bottom-up economics; information asymmetry; market energy; welfare dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D49 D52 D60 D61 I31 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08-18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11805/1/MPRA_paper_11805.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11303

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