All-pay auctions with resale

Yong Sui

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study equilibria of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale when players’ signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We show that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players’ valuations and creates a signaling incentive for players. We characterize symmetric bidding equilibria for both firstand second-price all-pay auctions with resale and provide sufficient conditions for existence of symmetric equilibria. Under our conditions we show that second-price all-pay auctions generate no less expected revenue than first-price all-pay auctions with resale. The initial seller could benefit from publicly disclosing his private information which is affiliated with players’ signals.

Keywords: all-pay auction; resale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10, Revised 2007-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11463/1/MPRA_paper_11463.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11463

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().