Counter-Terrorism Efforts by Government in case of hostage taking by negotiation and bargaining: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Aishwarya Harichandan

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper talks about the short term and long-term terrorist and the scenario of hostage taking. It takes into consideration whether the government should negotiate with them or not. It goes on to look into the expenditure by government on anti-terrorist activities depending upon the incidence of attacks and the political stability.

Keywords: Counter-terrorism; Game Theory; Government; Private players; Vigilance; Complements; Substitutes. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 Z00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-11-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:115728

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