Последовательные труэли: равновесие с выживанием сильнейшего

Sequential Truels: an equilibrium with the survival of the fittest

Ilinskiy Dmitry, Izmalkov Sergey and Savvateev Alexey

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A sequential truel is a generalisation of duel. This type of games is known because of the «survival of the weakest» paradox, where weakest player have the highest probability of survival. We analyse a typical variation of this model, in which players are allowed to shoot in the air. We show that there exists a SPE-equilibrium, where the strongest player, against the paradox statement, has the highest probability of survival.

Keywords: truel; SPE; survival of the weakest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12-25
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