ON THE CORE OF AN ECONOMY WITH ARBITRARY CONSUMPTION SETS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Anuj Bhowmik

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyses the properties of (strong) core allocations in a two-period asymmetric information economy that also involves both negligible and non-negligible agents as well as an infinite dimensional commodity space. Within this setup, we allow the consumption set of each agent to be an arbitrary subset of the commodity space that may not have any lower bound. Our first result deals with the robustness of the core and the strong core allocations with respect to the restrictions imposed on the size of the blocking coalitions in an economy with only non-negligible agents. The second result is a generalization of the first result to an economy that allows the simultaneous presence of negligible as well as non-negligible agents with the consideration of Aubin coalitions. Finally, we show that (strong) core allocations are coalitional fair in the sense that no coalition of negligible agents could redistribute among its members the net trade of any other coalition containing all non-negligible agents in a way that could assign a preferred bundle to each of its members, and vice versa.

Keywords: Mixed Economy; Core; Vind's theorem; Coalitionally fair allocations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D51 D8 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/117938/1/Bhowmik.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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