Does voluntary disclosure of polarizing information make polarization deeper? An online experiment on Russo-Ukrainian War

Philipp Chapkovski and Alexei Zakharov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Does the animosity toward a holder of an opposite political opinion or the behavior toward someone whose opinion on a divisive issue is unknown depends on whether that opinion was disclosed or withheld voluntarily? In order to study this question, we conducted a pre-registered study in Russia, measuring the pro-war dictators' behavior towards their partners with aligned or conflicting views on the war in Ukraine using give-or-take modification of Dictator Game. In the presence of a large polarisation gap (outgroup discrimination), we did not find that intentional vs. unintentional disclosure of the recipients' positions affected the transfers of the dictators; at the same time, dictators' beliefs about the share of war supporters among experiment participants and the donations made by other dictators were causally affected. Our study is the first one to consider this dimension of social interactions, and contributes to the quickly growing literature on political polarisation.

Keywords: disclosure; transparency; polarization; dictator game; war in Ukraine; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D64 D74 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cis, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:116305

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