Pretend-But-Perform Regulation of a Duopoly under Three Competition Modes
Ismail Saglam
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper considers a duopoly with asymmetric costs and demand uncertainty to study the welfare effects of pretend-but-perform regulation (PPR) of Koray and Sertel (1988) under three modes of competition, involving the Cournot, conjectural variations, and supply function competitions. PPR induces a two-stage game where each firm declares in the first stage a cost report and produces in the second stage accordingly. Theoretically characterizing and numerically computing the equilibrium of this game, we show that the consumer surplus increases if PPR is applied under the Cournot competition and it decreases if PPR is applied under the other modes of competition.
Keywords: Duopoly; regulation, Cournot, conjectural variations, supply function equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:116767
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