U-Turns in Pakistani Politics: A Complex Game of Political Chess

Khalid Zaman

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The present study investigates the occurrence of political U-turns in Pakistan by examining the most prominent politicians and their associated political parties. According to research, the phenomenon of 'political U-turns' has a detrimental impact on Pakistan's development and stability. This tendency also erodes public trust in the government and impedes progress towards improved economic and social conditions. Pakistan's legislators and policymakers must prioritise the country's long-term interests over their individual or party's immediate gains. For governments to secure the backing and trust of their constituents, they must exhibit greater transparency and accountability towards them. Ensuring the expression of individuals' viewpoints necessitates holding elected representatives responsible and actively engaging in the political sphere. This study highlights the imperative requirement for cooperation among all pertinent stakeholders in Pakistan to tackle the problem of 'political U-turns' and promote the nation's stability and progress.

Keywords: Pakistani politics; U-turns; Consequences; Suggestions; Country’s stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-04-17, Revised 2023-04-13
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Forthcoming in Politica 2.1(2023): pp. 1-8

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