Water Theft As Social Insurance: Southeastern Spain, 1851-1948: The Long Run

Javier Donna and Jose Espin Sanchez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The tragedy of the commons, when all members of a community suffer from each other’s overuse of a common good, is a pervasive problem. Communities that use a common good seem doomed to conflict and overuse. Conflict resolution with imperfect information in self-governed communities poses an important trade-off. Low punishments encourage overuse while high punishments inflict pain on those who need resources. Historically, however, many self-governed communities have managed to solve the collective-action problem.

Keywords: Law and economics; crime; punishment; dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
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