Lucas Paradox, Institutional Quality and Corruption: Evidence from D.R. Congo

Francis K. Mulowayi and Christian Pinshi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper aims to examine the Lucas paradox in the DRC, and more specifically to test whether institutional quality could be a key variable for the resolution of the paradox in the DRC. Using Granger’s dynamic causality analysis and Toda-Yamamoto’s in-depth analysis, we find that the Lucas paradox is true in the DRC, and that institutional quality, including corruption or macroeconomic management, are far from resolving this paradox in the DRC.

Keywords: Lucas Paradox; Foreign direct investment; Institutional quality; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C32 D73 E02 F21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/117370/1/Lucas%20Paradox%20%281%29.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/117383/1/Lucas%20Paradox%20%281%29.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:117370

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().