The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents

Stefan Behringer

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.

Keywords: Public Goods; Direct Provision; Asymmetric Information; Mechanism Design; Open Source Software (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B21 H30 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11796/1/MPRA_paper_11796.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11796

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