Stated versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test

Elisabet Rutstrom and Nathaniel Wilcox

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: If asking subjects their beliefs during repeated game play changes the way those subjects play, using those stated beliefs to evaluate and compare theories of strategic behavior is problematic. We experimentally verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. In this setting, belief elicitation improves the goodness of fit of structural models of belief learning, and the prior beliefs implied by such structural models are both stronger and more realistic when beliefs are elicited than when they are not. These effects are, however, confined to the player type who sees a strong asymmetry between payoff possibilities for her two strategies in the game. We also find that “inferred beliefs” (beliefs estimated from past observed actions of opponents) can be better predictors of observed actions than the “stated beliefs” resulting from belief elicitation.

Keywords: beliefs; stated beliefs; belief elicitation; inferred beliefs; estimated beliefs; belief updating; repeated games; experimental methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 C73 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11852

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