A New Approach To Optimal Solutions Of Noncooperative Games: Accounting For Savage–Niehans Risk

Vladislav Zhukovskiy, Lidia Zhukovskaya and Yulia Mukhina

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The novelty of the approach presented below is that each person in a conflict (player) seeks not only to increase his payoff but also to reduce his risk, taking into account a possible realization of any uncertainty from a given admissible set. A new concept, the so-called strongly-guaranteed Nash equilibrium in payoffs and risks, is introduced and its existence in mixed strategies is proved under standard assumptions of the theory of noncooperative games, i.e., compactness and convexity of the sets of players’ strategies and continuity of the payoff functions.

Keywords: Savage–Niehans risk; minimax regret; uncertainties; oncooperative game; optimal solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 C02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-rmg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:119395

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