Daily Commuting

Marcus Berliant

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Workers generally commute on a daily basis, so we model commuting as a repeated game. The folk theorem implies that for sufficiently large discount factors, the repeated commuting game has as a Nash equilibrium any feasible strategy that is uniformly better than the minimax strategy payoff for a commuter in the one shot game, repeated over the infinite horizon. This includes the efficient equilibria. An example where the efficient payoffs strictly dominate the one shot Nash equilibrium payoffs is provided. Our conclusions pose a challenge to congestion pricing in that equilibrium selection could be at least as effective in improving welfare. We examine evidence from St. Louis to determine what equilibrium strategies are actually played in the repeated commuting game.

Keywords: Repeated game; Nash equilibrium; Commuting; Folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-tre and nep-ure
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/119442/1/MPRA_paper_119442.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Daily commuting (2024)
Working Paper: Daily commuting (2023)
Working Paper: Daily commuting (2023)
Working Paper: Daily Commuting (2022)
Working Paper: Daily commuting (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:119442

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