The Egyptian Revolution as a Non-Cooperative Game of Conflict

Tarek Selim () and Ahmed Ezzeldin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, the ongoing subjective debate on the role of different players in the Egyptian revolution is assessed using Fraser Hipel technique for analyzing political conflicts. This analysis will open the door for an objective investigation of the conflict behind the Egyptian revolution. After 18 days of protests, the Egyptian protestors celebrated Mubarak’s resignation, and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) led the transitional period. However, the series of confrontations between SCAF and civil opposition have ignited an intense debate about the role of different players in the revolution. Still, most of these debates are based on subjective records and personal opinions. This paper will analyze the Egyptian revolution as a non-cooperative game using Fraser-Hipel technique to reach to a more objective understanding of the revolution. Fraser-Hipel Technique extends the notion of Nash equilibrium to apply it to different political conflicts. Due to the lack of objective records of the revolution, the ongoing debates are modeled into six scenarios to determine which ones can lead to the revolution outcome from a strategic perspective. In addition, the role of different players in realizing the outcome will be assessed. Among the core conclusions, the analysis negates the notion that Mubarak’s resignation was achieved through a coup d’état rather than a popular revolution. In addition, the possibility of a neutral stand of SCAF during the revolution is supported by this analysis.

Keywords: Conflict resolution; Egypt revolution; Non-cooperative game; Fraser-Hipel technique; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C72 H11 H12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11
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