The Economic Rationale of United States v. Google

German Bet, Roger Blair and Javier Donna

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust suit against Google alleging that Google has unlawfully monopolized the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising. The complaint raises questions involving market definition, monopoly power, and monopolizing conduct. In this article, we examine these issues through the lens of microeconomic principles. Our analysis finds that there is a sound economic rationale for the DOJ’s complaint.

Keywords: Monopolization; Google; Antitrust; Search Services; Search Advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K1 K14 K20 K21 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Published in Antitrust Bulletin 67.1(2022): pp. 23-39

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:121040

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