Information Disclosure Under Di§erent Modes of Regulation

Fabio Antoniou, Phoebe Koundouri () and Nikos Tsakiris ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this study we assume that the governments are uncertain about the future product demand in a standard eco-dumping model. Allowing the governments to obtain information from firms, we examine governments.and .rms.incentives to share information. We show that, when the governments regulate the polluting .rms through emission standards, then, the governments and the .rms will reach an agreement concerning information sharing. The opposite holds, when the governments regulate pollution through emission taxes.

Keywords: Strategic Environmental Policy; Pollution; Emission Standards; Emission Taxes; Information Sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 O21 Y10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-19
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Disclosure Under Different Modes of Regulation (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:122421

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