A note on Brandl and Brandt’s axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium

Andreas Schroeder

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The axiomatic requirements in Brandl and Brandt (2024) make it possible to define solution concepts that do not select the set of all Nash equilibria as claimed. More precisely, it is possible to construct solution concepts that fulfill the axiomatic requirements, but in certain games no equilibrium is selected at all, as a simple example shows.

Keywords: Non-coporative Game Theory; Nash Equilinrium; Solution Concept (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/123069/1/MPRA_paper_123069.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:123069

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().