Disbalances in inefficient equilibrium states in “vertical” relationships of agents

Dmytro Sokolovskyi (dmy.falko@gmail.com)

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The problem of identification of efficient economic conditions, arising from the «vertical» agents’ relationship, is considered. It’s shown that the application of classical concepts of market failure to estimate the intracorporate relationships is inexpedient. The application of the principal-agent theory using the concept of disbalances is considered. A number of examples of the interaction between economic agents, the eventual failure of whose can be proved by disbalances given. The pattern of evolutionary transformation of relationship, characterized by coordinating or strategic disbalance, is described for Pareto inefficient conditions and norms.

Keywords: efficiency; economic agents’ relationship; disbalances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C62 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02-12
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