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Jose Cuesta ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The effects of social transfers on individual participation and working hours are theoretically shown to differ for unitary and bargaining intrahousehold allocation models. This result is attributed to both the non-transferability of in-kind social transfers and differences in control of these transfers among household members. Using elasticities of social transfers on work effort (estimated through sample selection corrected participation probits and working hour OLS), new tests on intrahousehold allocation are developed for Chile. These tests strongly reject the unitary model and exogenous bargaining, accepting endogenous bargaining only among non-poor households. Poor households may use social incomes as investments for the future rather than for short-term strategic power relations.

Keywords: Social Transfers; Intrahousehold Allocation Rules; Labor Supply; Chile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08
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Published in Journal of Income Distribution 1/2.12(2004): pp. 76-104

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social Transfers as a Determinant of Intra-household Distribution: the case of Chile (2004) Downloads
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