Structure versus Agency in the Great Deprivation of 21st Century

Nadeem Naqvi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Agency-based explanations of the great deprivation, contrasted with structure-based explanations, suffer not merely from the criticism of relying on irrational and irresponsible behavior of millions, including that of the most astute financial experts, but are also at a loss to explain why such problems did not arise earlier when the same motivations and behavioral patterns were exhibited, thereby rendering such theories incomplete. Alternatively, if it is argued that such problems did not appear earlier because the economic structure was different then, then again attention must return to an examination of structure, not exclusively place blame on agency failures. (98 words)

Keywords: structure; agency; great deprivation; financial crisis; fiscal policy; monetary policy; skilled labor markets; American economy; involuntary unemployment; voluntary unemployment; education; training; skill acquisition; income distribution; China; India; Germany; Japan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E44 E66 F01 F16 F21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-lab and nep-mac
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