Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts

Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.

Keywords: Incomplete contracts; Know-how disclosure; Joint ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L22 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12533

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