On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation

Patrick W. Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The efficiency of two different means of controlling hazardous economic activities, namely ex post liability for harm done and ex ante safety regulation, is re-examined. Some researchers have stressed that the complementary use of these two instruments can be socially advantageous. Here it is argued that the models which have been built in order to support this view crucially depend on the assumption that there are persistent enforcement errors. It is demonstrated that such a rather unsatisfactory assumption is not needed if wealth varies among injurers.

Keywords: Liability; Safety Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K10 K13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (107)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12536/1/MPRA_paper_12536.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the joint use of liability and safety regulation (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12536

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().