The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory

Patrick Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article provides a non-technical survey on recent topics in the theory of contracts. The hold-up problem is presented and the incomplete contracts approach is discussed. Emphasis is put on conceptual problems and open questions that await further research.

Keywords: Contract Theory; Hold-Up Problem; Incomplete Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (92)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12562

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