Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences

Swapnendu Banerjee and Somenath Chakraborty

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We examine the impact of social preferences on the choice between individual production and team production. An inequity-averse principal can hire a single or a team of two agents to work on a single project. The agents are inequity-averse with respect to the principal. We show that even without ‘synergy’ a moderately inequity-averse principal can opt for team production. Thus we provide an additional rationale for the empirically observed prevalence of team based production in terms of the possible existence of social preferences. For sufficiently inequity-averse principal the incentive for team production remains the same across short-term and long-term relationships.

Keywords: Social Preferences; Inequity Aversion; Individual Production; Team Production; Synergy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D86 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-mac, nep-mic, nep-ppm and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:125933

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