Motivations behind Peer-to-Peer (Counter-)Punishment in Public Goods Games: An Experiment

Kenju Kamei and Katy Tabero

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It is well-known that efficiency often fails to improve in public goods games with peer-to-peer punishment when counter-punishment is possible. This paper experimentally demonstrates, for the first time, that the effects of sanctioning institutions are modest, regardless of the decision-making format (individual or team). In the “team” conditions, subjects are randomly assigned to teams of three, and make joint decisions through communication. Their dialogue provides valuable insights into the motivations behind (counter-)punishment, as well as the resulting behavioral effects. A coding exercise reveals that first-order punishments (and counter-punishments) are primarily emotional responses to peers’ low contributions (and first-order punishments, respectively).

Keywords: C92; D01; H49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D01 H41 H49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-03
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