Why labor-managed firms may not be socially desirable

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We employ a game-theoretic model to analyze five duopoly regimes: (1) state-owned and labor-managed firms, (2) labor-managed firms, (3) state-owned and capitalist firms, (4) capitalist firms, and (5) capitalist and labor-managed firms. We compare the welfare outcomes across these regimes and find that labor-managed firms may not be socially desirable due to their adverse impact on economic welfare. This may help explain why labor-managed firms are relatively rare compared to capitalist firms.

Keywords: Capitalist firm; Cournot model; Economic welfare; Labor-managed firms; State-owned firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-sbm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:126158

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