Elections and Water Pollution Cleanup in the Ganges River in India

Amitrajeet Batabyal and Seung Jick Yoo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze the role of regular elections in ensuring water pollution cleanup in the Ganges river in a north Indian city. Our central result is that, in the absence of elections, politicians have no incentive to undertake pollution cleanup, leading to poor environmental outcomes. In contrast, when elections are present, retrospective voting by a representative voter, who re-elects incumbents only if observed cleanup exceeds a threshold, can effectively discipline politicians. We show that this threshold strategy induces politicians to choose positive levels of pollution abatement in equilibrium. By explicitly characterizing the optimization problems of the politician, the voter, and the resulting equilibrium, we demonstrate that electoral accountability can serve as a powerful mechanism for improving water quality in the Ganges. Our findings highlight the critical role of democratic institutions in mitigating environmental externalities in developing country contexts.

Keywords: Election; Ganges River; Pollution Cleanup; Retrospective Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01-17, Revised 2026-03-24
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