The Firm as a Community of Belonging

Carlos Federico Obregon Diaz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical model of the firm based on the concept of belonging, defined as the degree of relational and institutional integration of individuals within an organization. It proposes that belonging determines the structure of internal competition, cooperation, and overall firm performance. The model distinguishes between low-belonging equilibria characterized by internal conflict and inefficiency, and high-belonging equilibria characterized by cooperation and improved economic outcomes. The framework incorporates elements of game theory and institutional analysis to explain how organizational structures influence equilibrium selection. The paper contributes to the literature on institutional economics, organizational behavior, and firm theory by introducing belonging as a key explanatory variable linking micro-level interactions with macro-level performance.

Keywords: Belonging; Philosophy; of; Belonging; Firm; Theory; Organizational; Economics; Institutional; Economics; Corporate; Governance; Organizational; Culture; Cooperation; and; Competition; Game; Theory; Nash; Equilibrium; Social; Capital; Relational; Economics; Stakeholder; Theory; Business; Ethics; Organizational; Performance; Institutional; Legitimacy; Economic; Sociology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 L20 L22 M14 O10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-17
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