Financing the Freight Railway Infrastructure: An Underappreciated Policy Option?

Russell Pittman

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Reform and restructuring of state-owned monopoly freight railways have generally followed one of two strategies. Each has had some success, but the European model of competing train operating companies over a monopoly track has suffered from a lack of reliable infrastructure funding, while the Americas model of competition among vertically integrated railways has suffered from the difficulty of protecting “captive” shippers. This paper proposes a third option that arguably addresses the weaknesses of both models: the “competitive rules joint venture” already observed in US, Canadian, and Mexican port and belt railroads.

Keywords: Freight railways; restructuring; competition; infrastructure financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L92 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-21
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:128816

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