A Non-Activation Theorem for Platforms

Yuhei Hamada

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We identify the conditions under which every economic field (including platforms) is behaviorally equivalent to a pure field. The conditions hold if and only if every searcher either has complete information, or has incomplete information with an infinite attention budget (λ j = ∞) and zero opportunity cost (K j = 0) (Non-Activation Theorem).

Keywords: Platform Economics; Mechanism Design; Search Theory; Information Economics; Matching Theory; Pure Field; Economic Field (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D00 D01 D40 D47 D80 D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-19
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