Las señales no desaparecen, evolucionan: erosión informativa y señalización adaptativa bajo shocks exógenos de costo

Signals Don't Disappear, They Evolve: Informational Erosion and Adaptive Signaling under Exogenous Cost Shocks

Ivan Ladera

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic conceptual framework that extends classical signaling theory (Spence, 1973) to analyze the informational consequences of exogenous reductions in signaling costs. The informational content of a signal is operationalized through the Signal Informational Content (SIC), a measurement construct directly linked to the separating equilibrium condition that enables the evolution of a signal's informational value to be tracked following exogenous cost shocks. The paper also introduces the Separating Capacity Conservation Principle (SCCP), according to which competitive selection markets tend to restore differentiation whenever a signal loses informational content. In response to technological, institutional, organizational, or social shocks that reduce the cost of emitting a signal, receivers may adapt through internal signal stratification or substitution toward alternative signals. The framework identifies four conditions under which informational erosion is likely to occur, derives three empirically testable propositions, and integrates these mechanisms within the Dynamic Signal Erosion Framework (DSEF). Unlike the literature on credential inflation, screening, educational devaluation, and dynamic signaling, the proposed framework explicitly models exogenous cost reductions as the causal mechanism underlying informational erosion and extends the analysis to both formal and informal signals in educational and labor markets. Finally, the paper presents illustrative applications involving selective educational programs, international scholarships, generative artificial intelligence, digital technical certifications, and youth leadership credentials.

Keywords: teoría de la señalización; erosión informativa; inflación de credenciales; equilibrio separador; señalización dinámica; inteligencia artificial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 I26 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07-10
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