Exploitation déléguée: les ouvrages reviennent, la capacité ne revient pas

Delegated operation: the works come back, the capability does not

Nizar Younes Mqam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Titre original : « Exploitation déléguée : les ouvrages reviennent, la capacité ne revient pas » (texte en français). Le droit français est généreux avec le propriétaire public : les ouvrages nécessaires au service lui appartiennent dès leur construction, même si le contrat n'en dit rien. Un bon contrat de concession va plus loin et garantit leur état au moment de la remise. Mais ni la loi ni le contrat ne rendent ce qui permet de s'en servir. La capacité d'exploiter n'est ni inventoriée, ni valorisée, ni exigée. Elle part avec le sortant, et il faut la racheter. English summary: In French law, the works needed for a delegated public service belong to the public owner from the moment they are built, and a good concession contract also guarantees their condition at handover. Neither the law nor the contract, however, returns the capability to operate them. That operating capability is neither inventoried, nor valued, nor required; it leaves with the outgoing operator and has to be bought back. The study draws on case law, concession contracts and ISO 55001:2024 to show where this transfer cost sits in public service delegation. Cahiers de technopolitique, no. 4, 19 September 2026, version 1.2 of 7 October 2026. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23217223. https://technopolitique.eu/cahiers/n4/

Keywords: exploitation déléguée; délégation de service public; concession; biens de retour; réversibilité; client intelligent; gestion d'actifs; ISO 55001:2024; partenariat public-privé; delegated management; concession contracts; public-private partnership; asset management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H54 K12 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-19, Revised 2026-10-07
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Published in Cahiers de technopolitique 4 (2026): pp. 1-12

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