Destructive power, enforcement and institutional change

Mehrdad Vahabi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Institutions are usually defined as rules of the game. But if rules are dead letters without being enforced, then what is the role of destructive power in the genesis of institutions? This is the first question which will be addressed in the present paper. While the importance of incremental or evolutionary changes in informal rules is undeniable, what is the role of destructive power or revolution in politics with regard to institutional change? To what extent is destructive power involved in the change of rules? This is the second question that will be tackled in the present paper. The purpose of this paper is to answer these two questions focusing on a point that current scholarship regarding institutions usually fail to notice, with an emphasis on rules and laws: the power that enforces those rules and laws. The analysis of different forms of power will demonstrate the fact that the capacity to destroy as well as the capacity to produce plays a role in generating and maintaining institutions. I will try to show that the recognition of destructive power sheds new light on at least three major issues: i) the relationship between property rights and sovereignty, ii) the importance of revolution as well as evolution in social change, iii) the emergence of various means of collective expression such as Luddism, universal suffrage, and association.

Keywords: Destructive power; creative power; exit, voice and scream; institutional change; enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 D74 D81 E11 F5 H41 K0 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09, Revised 2006-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Economics and Business 1.9(2006): pp. 59-89

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13236/1/MPRA_paper_13236.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:13236

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().