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Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment

Christian Ewerhart and Patrick Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) have conjectured that exclusive use of negligence liability leads to suboptimal choice of precaution in the presence of uncertainty and that ex ante regulation can correct these inefficiencies. We complete their argument by making a mild additional premise.

Keywords: Liability; Safety Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment (1998)
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