Visitor and firm taxes versus environmental options in a dynamical context

Angelo Antoci, Marcello Galeotti and Lucio Geronazzo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The main objective of the paper is to analyze the effects on economic agents’ behavior deriving from the introduction of financial activities aimed to environmental protection. The environmental protection mechanism we study should permit exchange of financial activities among citizens, firms, and Public Administration. Such a particular “financial market” is regulated by the Public Administration, but mainly fuelled by the interest of two classes of involved agents: firms and dwelling citizens. We assume that the adoption process of financial decisions is described by a two-population evolutionary game and we study the basic features of the resulting dynamics.

Keywords: Environmental options; environment preserving technologies; evolutionary games; tourism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D53 G11 G22 Q20 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Visitor and Firm Taxes Versus Environmental Options in a Dynamical Context (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:13667

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