A Correspondence Analysis of Labour Market Institutions
Bruna Bruno and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
The aim of the paper is to combine the systemic approach to labour market institutions with the analysis of the role played by the organisational forms of the bargaining partners, which favour coordination both inter partes and intra partes, in order to characterise the 19 countries considered. The methodology adopted is based on Multiple Correspondence Analysis and on the use of a device called doubling. The results show a clear-cut distinction between two groups of countries: the former is characterised by the absence of institutional mechanisms of coordination whereas the latter by the presence of the organisational forms. In details, the countries with regulated labour market functioning but without any control of wages at macroeconomic level have the worst long term unemployment performance. The inter partes coordination role of the government entails the choice of a specific trade-off between direct intervention in the bargaining process and fiscal policy. This trade off performs well when it is supported by intra partes coordination devices. The evidence confirms the existence of the institutional equivalence, leading to the conclusion that better nemployment performances go along with specific institutional set-ups.
Keywords: labour market institutions; organisations; centralisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C1 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999, Revised 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Economia & Lavoro 3.35(2001): pp. 1-44
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14245/1/MPRA_paper_14245.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Working Paper: A Correspondence Analysis of Labour Market Institutions (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:14245
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().