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The Value for Actions-Set Games

Emilio Calvo () and Amparo Urbano

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Action-Set games are transferable utility games where the set of players is finite, every player has a finite set of actions, and the worth of the game is a function of the actions taken by the players. In this setting a rule has to determine individual payoffs at each combinations of actions. Following an axiomatic approach, we define the set of Consistent Bargaining Equilibria.

Keywords: Action-set games; Shapley value; Prekernel; Consistent Bargaining Equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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