Nonmarket performance: Evidence from U.S. electric utilities

Jean-Philippe Bonardi (), Guy Holburn and Rick Vanden Bergh

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of ‘political markets’ – where firms transact over public policies with government policy-makers – we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms’ nonmarket strategies. We propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians; the firm’s recent experience with policy-makers; and the opportunity to learn from other firms’ recent experiences; and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies. Using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of U.S. privately-owned electric utilities over a 13 year period, we find empirical support for our arguments.

Keywords: Nonmarket strategy; lobbying; Electric utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L94 M1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

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