Une explication des motivations rationnelles de la Chine au surendettement de l'économie américaine

Chinese incentives of american overindebtness

Marc-Antoine Jambu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The current financial and economic crisis is not du to the Dollar paradox. That's why the growing "Global Imbalances" remains an interesting issue. By mixing theories from the litterature of Foreign Direct Investment in China and the Collateral theory developped in [Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, Garber, (2004)], webuild a model which give an explanation of the American Tresory Bonds reserve held by the Chinese Central Bank. We show that the Chinese governement doesn't really need to worry about the solvability of the American economy. Moreover Chinese governement has rational intensives for american overindebtness. The main limit of this strategy consist in less human capital accumulation expectations from the FDI positive externalities. Besides we show how inflation pressures, du to incomplete sterilisation of the chinese monetary policy, can be moderate by positive productivity and quality shocks. To finish we conclude that Chinese governement has no insentive to protect intellectual property rights, whereas WTO commitments have to be assumed.

Keywords: FDI; Global imbalances; Collateral Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E2 E31 E58 F21 F32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-tra
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