A Characterization of the Shapley Value for Cooperative Games

Chih-Ru Hsiao and Wen-Lin Chiou

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we define the partially consistent property of the solutions for cooperative games and use the property to characterize the Shapley value. This is different from the characterization of the Shapley value by applying the consistency property proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell.

Keywords: Shapley value; Reduced Game; Partialy Consistent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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