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政治市场博弈:结构与行为

Political Market Games: Structure and Behavior

Weiting Huang ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: How different political market structures influence the behaviors of participants and the distribution of benefits was studied n the framework of game theory. Theoretical model showed that in the monopolized political market, the participation surplus of participants would serve as the rents of monopoly power. However, when the political market competition, such as the oligarchic political market, would lead to reverse the redistribution of benefits, that is, the leaders’ surplus of political oligarchy would transferred to the participants. Additionally, in the extended spatial model, we concluded the basic distribution of political alliance. Based on these conclusions, we discussed the "center-periphery" proposition, and pointed out that there exist a trap of development; we also pointed how ideological conflict, clash of civilizations, economic geographic proximity would influence the political behaviors. In the end, two cases, that is, Japan's postwar development and cross-strait “diplomatic war” were studied.

Keywords: political; market; structure; and; behavior; rents; surplus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F02 F59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11
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